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ABSTRACT
In Neumark and Wascher (1992), we present findings supporting the earlier consensus that
minimum wages reduce employment for teens and young adults, with elasticities in the range -0.1
to -0.2. In addition, we find that subrninimum wages moderate these disemployment effects.
Card, Katz and Krueger (1993) criticize numerous aspects of our analysis, and contest our
conclusions. This reply presents an assessment of their arguments, as well as additional evidence
related to some of the criticisms that they raise. We conclude that the issues raised by Card. et
aL. upon further examination, do not alter the conclusions from our original paper, and in some
cases even reinforce those conclusions.
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and NBERI. Introduction and Summary
In Neumark and Wascher (1992), we present findings supporting the earlier
consensus that minimum wages reduce employment for teens and young adults, with
elasticities in the range -0.1to-0.2. In addition, we find that subminimum wages moderate
these disemployment effects. Although our results on minimum wage effects generally
conform with earlier research, they contrast with some recent studies that find little or no
effect of minimum wages on employment, or even positive effects (Wellington, 1991: Card,
1992a and 1992b; Spriggs. 1992; Katz and Krueger. 1992; Card and Krueger, 1993).1 Card,
Katz and Krueger (1993, hereafter CKK) attempt to reconcile these disparate findings by
challenging our results. Because research on minimum wages is likely to influence policy
decisions, we regard efforts at reconciling the conflicting evidence (including CKK, as well
as Currie and Fallick (1993)) as important. Furthermore, we suspect that some of the
substance of our exchange with CKK will ultimately prove useful in such efforts. However,
based on our assessment of their criticisms, we do not believe that CKK's arguments or
evidence alter the conclusions from our original paper.
CKK group their criticisms of our paper into five areas: the inclusion and
measurement of school enrollment rates, measurement of the coverage rate, the
specification of the minimum wage variable, the role of lagged minimum wage effects, and
evidence on the use of subminimum wages. Below, we summarize the main points of our
reply. More detailed responses and the evidence on which they are based are provided in
Section II.
Enrollment Rates
CKK first raise the question of whether regression equations typically used to
estimate minimum wage effects should include supply variables. We argue, as have others.that if minimum wages are not binding for all (or most) of the observations in our data set,
then supply variables will help determine employment. As partial evidence that excluding
the school enrollment rate from the employment equation is a misspecification, we note that
disemployment effects of minimum wages should be stronger for teens than for young
adults, but that this holds only when the enrollment rate is included.
Second, CKKpointout that our definition of the enrollment rate precludes joint
employment and enrollment, resulting in a stronger negative association between
employment and enrollment than does an alternative measure that permits individuals to he
counted as both employed and enrolled in school. In response, we present evidence that
there is a sharper dichotomy between employment and enrollment than CKK claim.
Moreover, CKK's claim that our enrollment rate is one minus the employment rate (plus
measurement error) is refuted by the fact that the sum of the enrollment rate and the
employment rate is related to minimum wages and other labor market conditions. More
substantively, there is a sizable proportion of individuals neither in school nor employed.
and this proportion is systematically negatively related to minimum wages.
Nonetheless, we do find that the estimated disemployment effects of minimum wages
for teenagers, treating enroflment rates as exogenous, are in fact somewhat sensitive to the
definition of the enrollment rate; art alternative definition of enrollment that allows some
joint employment and enrollment suggests weaker, but still negative disemployment effects
of minimum wages. We also note, however, that the estimates for young adults (aged 16-
24) are not sensitive to the definition of the enrollment rate, and that estimates correcting
for the potential endogeneity of enrollments indicate negative minimum wage effects for
both the teenage and young-adult specifications.
2The Coverage Rate
CKKcriticize our coverage rate on the grounds that it mismeasures coverage of teens
or young adults by federal and state minimum wage laws. They present evidence that an
increase in coverage in 1985 for public sector workers did not result in employment declines
relative to trend, which they interpret as evidence that our coverage measure is flawed, or
that minimum wages have no effect. However, we argue that this is not a particularly good
experiment, because (i) the real value of the minimum wage was declining over this period,
(ii) public sector employment of youths is relatively low, and (iii) it seems inappropriate to
test the competitive model of minimum wages using workers in the public sector.
Moreover, regressions at the state level, controlling for other variables that affect
emploment, and not restricted to this particular coverage increase, indicate that higher
coverage is associated with lower employment of teens and young adults.
TheKaitz lndet
CKK arguethat thestandardcoverage-adjusted relative minimum wage variable (the
Kaitz index) used in most minimum wage studies is flawed because it is negatively
correlated with the mean teen (or young'adult) wage. We show here, however, that a
negative correlation between the relative minimum wage variable and the mean teen or
young-adult wage does not contradict the suitability of the Kaitz index. For example. if the
nominal minimum wage were fixed, an appropriate minimum wage variable should decline
when the mean teen or young-adult wage rises, since the real value of the minimum wage
falls. We then argue that a better test of the Kaitz index is whether it is positively
correlated with the relative price of teen or young-adult labor, and whether this positive
correlation stems from changes in minimum wage levels or coverage. We show that the
Kaitz index satisfies these conditions.
3CKK also assert thatregressing employment rates on minimum wage levels, rather
thanonminimumwagesrelative to wages of older workers,provides betterestimates of
minimum wage effects, and they show that such estimates are positive or non-negative. In
our view, though, the principal disemployment effect of minimum wages is likely to result
from the substitution of older, higher-wage workers for younger, lower-wage workers, and
the relevant price driving this substitution is the relative price of these types of labor.
Moreover, using a nominal minimum wage variable does not capture changes in the bite
of the minimum wage associated with changes in the nominal mean teen or young-adult
wage, and implicitly assumes that the labor demand curve violates standard homogeneity
assumptions. Because, as we show, the data are largely uninformative with respect to the
correct specification of the minimum wage variable, we are inclined towards the
theoretic-ally preferred specification.
Lagged Minimum Wage Effects
CKK also address our earlier analysis of Card's (1992a) experiment that uses regional
variation to study minimum wage effects. In particular, we argue that the presence of
lagged minimum wage effects biases his short (one-year) first-difference estimates away
from finding disemployment effects. CKK counter that using two-year differences does not
overturn his results. We point out, however, that using two-year differences is not the same
as introducing lags. and we show that, in our data, two-year differences still obscure lagged
negative minimum wage effects.
Submininuim Wage Usage
Finally, CKK question our conclusions regarding subminimum wages. They claim
that our plots of the wage distribution documenting usage of subminimum wages are
misleading because five-cent ranges are used rather than exact figures. However, the
4evidence suggests that this procedure does not give a misleading impression, because most
CPS respondentsreporthourly wage rates that are multiples of five cents. Also, we present
evidence that contrasts with two of their claims. First, among the states with minimum
wages exceeding the federal minimum, we find little or no evidence of a spike in the wage
distribution at $3.50 per hour for any state except Minnesota. Second, the spikes at the
subminimum wage that we find in wage distributions for teenagers do not appear in wage
distributions for older workers. Both of these findings reinforce the evidence that
subminimum wage laws induce spikes in the wage distribution at the subminimum.
CKK also argue that low usage of subminimum wage provisions implies that these
provisions cannot have much of an impact. We show that, in fact, a relatively small
proportion of workers at the subminimum is not inconsistent with our evidence on the
moderating impact of subminimum wages on the disemployment effects of minimum wages.
Because the disemployment effects of minimum wages are small relative to teen
employment, a small fraction of employment at the subminimum is sufficient to produce the
offset to the disemployment effects that we report.
11. Detailed Responses
A.Enrollment Rates
The firstquestion CKK raise regarding the enrollment rate is whether it should be
included in the employment equation. CKK argue that we are estimating an employment
demand equation. and that it is "far from clear that supply-side variables, such as the
enrollment rate, belong in this equation.' They cite the Brown, et al. (1982) survey as
evidence that researchers have not included the school enrollment rate in their preferred
specifications.
However, Brown, et a!. explicitly argue against the view that employment is demand-
Sdetermined in the presence of minimum wages (p. 501). In fact, while it is true thai in
Table I of Brown, et a!.. only four of the 24 time-series studies surveyed include school
enrollment as a control variable, a far higher proportion (three-fourths) of the studies
include some supply variables, such as the percentage in the armed forces or the population
share.
The rationale for including supply variables can be made clear by recognizing that
the aggregate employment equation that we (and others) estimate is a combination of
observations for which the minimum wage is binding and observations for which it is not.
For the observations for which the minimum wage is binding, employment is determined
solely by the demand function (ignoring lags)
(1)EN =aMWX° +
whereEN is the employment rate, MW is the minimum wage variable, and XD is a vector of
demand shifters. In contrast, employment for the observations for which the minimum
wage is non-binding is determined by the reduced form of the labor demand function and
the labor supply function.2 This reduced form is
(2)EN =XDBN + XyN+
whereXs is a vector of supply shifters, and the "N" superscript indicates "non-binding."
Because aggregate employment is EB +EN,a single equation for employment, even if it is
difficult to interpret structurally, should include X', Xs, and MW, as in
(3)E =aMW+X% + Xy+
Inour paper, we further argue that the enrollment rate is a supply variable that
belongs in the employment equation. One basis for this assertion relates to the expectation
that if minimum wages reduce employment, they should do so more for teenagers than for
young adults, because a higher proportion of teenagers are minimum-wage workers.3 As it
6turns out, thisresultholds in our data only for specifications including the enrollment rate.
Furthermore, for the broader young-adult age group (aged 16-24), we find significant
negative employment effects of minimum wages whether or not we include the enrollment
rate. While CKK criticize our specifications including the enrollment rate, they offer no
interpretation of the puzzling difference between the results for teenagers and young adults
inthespecifications that exclude enrollment. In contrast, we interpret this difference as
suggesting that the model excluding the enrollment rate is misspecified.
CKK also object to the enrollment variable that we use, on the grounds that it
measures the proportion of persons who are both enrolled in school and not employed, and
they suggest an alternative definition of the enrollment rate that would not preclude joint
enrollment and employment.4 What our variable measures, conceptually, is the proportion
of individuals who are in school and, as evidenced from their behavior, have decided
against seeking employment. This measure seems most likely to capture supply shifts that
might affect the employment rate. By way of contrast, if we were estimating an equation
for hours of work (rather than the employment rate), controlling for enrollments that occur
jointly with employment might be more appropriate, since such enrollments may affect
hours independently of any effects on employment. However, given our focus on
employment, we see no a priori case for concluding that we have used the wrong'
enrollment rate.
CKKpresenttwoargumentssuggesting that our definition of enrollment as excluding
employment is inappropriate. First, they note that, based on 1988 May CPS data using a
separate question on school enrollment status, 75 percent of teenagers are enrolled in
school, while 65 percent of employed teenagers are also enrolled in school. They then
argue that this fact implies that our enrollment rate is based on a "false dichotomy' between
7employment and enrollment. However, their comparison does not speak to the validity of
this dichotomy; to see this, note that the enrollment rate among non-employed teenagers
could, in principle, be 100 percent. To assess the validity of the dichotomy, it is necessary
to compare either the enrollment rate of employed teenagers to the enrollment rate of non-
employed teenagers. or alternatively, the employment rate of enrolled teenagers to the
employment rate of non-enrolled teenagers. Using the 1988 May CPS (corresponding to the
data set that CKK use), the first comparison shows an enrollment rate for employed
teenagers of0.67versus an enrollment rate for non-employed teenagers of 0.84. The
second comparison yields an employment rate among those enrolled in high school, or
enrolled part-rime or full-time in college, of 0.38, versus an employment rate among the
non-enrolledof0.60. In both cases, the relevant comparison indicates that the dichotomy
between enrollment and employment is sharper than CKK suggest, although we recognize
that our enrollment measure may nonetheless overstate the distinction.
CKK also conclude, based on the comparison they report, that "Far from being
mutually exclusive activities, schooling and work go hand-in-hand for most teenagers." This
conclusion does not follow from their comparison and is inconsistent with the facts. Again
using the data for May 1988, 47.6 percent of teenagers were in school and not employed.
while only 29.1 percent were in school and employed.
CKK's second argument against our definition of the enrollment rate is that it poses
econometric problems.In particular,they assert that our enrollment measure is 'one minus
the employment rate" plus noise attributable to sampling error, in which case our results
would reflect a spurious negative relationship between enrollment and employment.
However, their characterization of our enrollment rate is inconsistent with the evidence. As
noted above, the proportion of respondents indicating neither employment nor enrollment is
8substantial, and it varies widely. Moreover, if CKK's characterization of our enrollment
rate is correct, then when we estimate equation (3) with least squares, the estimates of a
and B should not be significantly different from zero, and the estimate of y should not be
significantly different from -1. It is true that our estimates of y are relatively close to
negative one (typically around -0.75 to -0.8). But we also find estimates of a and B
(including the coefficients of the state and year dummy variables) that are significantly
different from zero, which contradicts CKK's claim.6
There is another way to make this point that sheds additional light on the effects of
minimum wages. If CKK are correct, the sum of our enrollment rate and the employment
rate is simply one plus sampling error, and should not be systematically related to any
variable. In contrast, Table I shows that the sum of employment and enrollment rates is
generally significantly negatively related to the minimum wage variable. While this result
again contradicts CKK's assertion, these findings are of interest in their own right, as they
show that minimum wages increase the proportion of workers neither employed nor
enrolled. Minimum wage increases might have this effect, for example, if individuals leave
school to queue for minimum wage jobs, or if they leave school and take jobs, displacing
other lower-wage workers who remain out of school.7
Although CKK's characterization of our enrollment variable appears to be incorrect,
we are, as in our original paper. interested in exploring the range of estimated minimum
wage effects that can be obtained under plausible alternative specifications. In this sense.
CKK'scriticismof our enrollment rate highlights another specification issue that ought to be
thrown into the ring." Specifically, we can test the sensitivity of the estimated minimum
wage effects to the definition of enrollment by using an alternative definition that isbased
on major activity during the survey week, and is available from the May CPS's for our
9entire sample period. This definition counts as enrolled any individualwhose major actlvit\
is school and who is working, although it does not include those whose major activity is
work and who are in school. Thus, while this enrollment definition does not fully reflect
t.he potential overlap between school and work, it nonetheless captures most of this
overlap. As evidence of this, we note that CKK report that based on the independent
enrollment question in the May 1988 CPS,75percent of teenagers are enrolled in school.
Using enrollment based on major activity in the survey week, 68 percent of teenagers are
measured as enrolled in school.
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 present estimates of minimum wage effects on
employment using this alternative definition of enrollment; for comparison, the other
columns provide previously reported results first excluding the enrollment rate, and then
including it, but with the definition used in our paper. As might be expected, given that
these estimates are based on an alternative enrollment measure that does not necessarily
preclude employment, the estimated coefficients of the enrollment measure are smaller for
both teenagers and young adults. The important question, however, regards the sensitivity
of the estimated minimum wage effect. For young adults, the estimated minimum wage
elasticity is virtually unchanged. For teens, the resulting elasticity is -0.11 instead of -0.19.
near the lower end of the range of the estimated disemployment effects that we report in
our paper, but still within that range.9
A potential problem with the estimates using either of the enrollment rates is that
enrollment may be endogenous with respect to employment. We raised this warning flag in
our paper, and have recently completed research (Neumark and Wascher, 1993a) that
attempts to correct for the eridogeneity bias, using state-specific measures of variables that
can be viewed as exogenous influences on the enrollment decisions of teenagers and young
10adults. As reportedin the last row of Table 2, the endogeneity-corrected results indicate
negative effects ofminimum wages on employment, using either definitionof the
enrollmentrate.Again,though, with the alternative enrollment rate, the estimated
minimum wage effect is statistically significant only for young adults, for whom the data are
basedon larger samples.1°
B. The Coverage Raze
CKKcriticize our coverage variable becauseit is basedon publishedfigures
pertaining to all workers rather than just teenagers andyoungadults, and because it does
nottake account ofcoverage by state minimum wage laws. We would like to have been
ableto assess the sensitivity of ourresultsto the mismeasurement attributable to using
coverage forallworkers,butthereare no published coverage estimates by state for these
narrower age groups. Similarly, as discussed inouroriginalpaper (p. 58), obtaining
informationon coverage by state laws is difficult, although some information is available for
the early years of our sample. However, it is worth noting that because our models include
state and year effects, problems arise from the mismeasurement of coverage only if relative
coverage rates of young workers and all workers change differentially across states. This
could occur, for example, if coverage expands in industries that employ relatively more
youngworkersand that account for varying employment shares across states.
CKK then attempttodemonstrate the inadequacyofourcoveragevariable by
presenting a plot of the aggregate teen employment rate andthepopulation-weighted
averageofourcoverage rate. The increase in coverage in 1985,duetothe extension of
coverage to state and local governmentworkers,provides, intheirview,a natural
experiment.Theplot shows that after 1985 the teen employmentratedidnotincrease by
less thanpredicted by a trend andthe overall employment-to-populationratio, despite the
11increase in coverage.
In ourview,however, the graph presented by CKK does not depict a very good
natural experiment. Withnominalwages rising, and with the federal minimum wage and
the minimum wage in a vast majority of states fixed, the effective minimum wage fell over
this period, offsetting disemployment effects associated with higher coverage rates.
Moreover, there may have been little overall employment response to the 1985 increase in
coverage associated with the readmission of state and local government employees to the
FLSAsimplybecause relatively few teens and young adults work for state and local
governments.'2 Finally, testing the competitive view of minimum wages based on an
increase in coverage in the public sector seems inappropriate, since state and local
governments may simply increase revenues to meet the higher wage bill entailed by
expanded coverage.
A method of assessing the coverage variable that is more general than looking solely
at the 1985 increase in public sector coverage, and that controls for other factors affecting
employment of young workers, is to estimate our employment equation separating the
coverage rate from the relative minimum wage. Such estimates are reported in Table 313
Theestimated elasticities of employment with respect to coverage are always negative, and
are significant in all specifications but one. Thus, while the coverage data are not ideal,
increases in measured coverage appear to yield the negative employment effects predicted
by the standard model of minimum wages.'4
C. The Kaitz Index
CKK's third criticism relates to our use of the Kaitz index as a minimum wage
variable (and the use of this variable in most other studies of minimum wage effects; see,
e.g.. Brown, et al. (1982)). This variable is the product of coverage and the minimum wage
12level, divided by the mean wage for all workers in the state (regardless of age)) The
motivation for the coverage adjustment is that any increase in the minimum should have a
larger employment effect if the minimum covers more workers. The motivation for dividing
by the mean wage is twofold: to measure how much the minimum "cuts into' the wage
distribution, and to obtain a measure of the relative level of the minimum wage as
compared with market-determined wages for above-minimum wage workers (Brown, et a!..
1982).
The basis of CKK's criticism is their assertion that our minimum wage index ought to
'have a positive association with the average wage of teenagers.' The notion underlying
their assertion is that minimum wages are supposed to provide a quasi-natural experiment
to study the effects of exogenous wage increases on employment. Obviously, such an
experiment is informative only to the extent that minimum wages actually increase the price
of the affected workers. However, asCKK show, conditioning on the control variables
(here the inclusion of the enrollment variable is irrelevant) and fixed state and year effects,
the association is negative. CKK provide what is presumably the correct explanation of this
fact: because the denominator of the minimum wage variable is the average wage for all
workers, a positive partial correlation between average wage levels of teens or young adults
and average wages of all workers will induce a negative partial correlation between the
average teen or young-adult wage and the minimum wage index. Based on this result, CKK
conclude that a literal interpretation of the negative association that we find between
employment rates and the minimum wage index is that "demand curves slope up, not
down,"
However, the basic premise underlying CKK's criticism is incorrect. In the absence
of minimum wage increases we would expect a negative, rather than a positive, association
13between the minimum wage index and the average wage of teenagers, if the average wages
of teenagers and all workers move together. In this case the minimum wage index is
capturing exactly the right effect: the increase in nominal wages relative to a fixed minimum
wage means that the "effective' minimum wage has fallen. Thus, we should not expect an
appropriately defined minimum wage index always to have a positive association with the
average wage of teenagers or young adults.
What properties should we expect of an appropriate minimum wage index, or more
specifically, the Kaitz index? One requirement would seem to be that since the Kaitz index
measures minimum wages relative to the mean wage for all workers, it should be positively
associated with the mean teen (or young-adult) wage relative to the mean wage for all
workers. Columns (I) and (3) of Table 4 show that this is indeed the case. Of course the
positive estimated coefficients on the Kaitz index in these columns could reflect movements
in the mean wage for all workers, which is the denominator of both the Kaitz index and the
dependent variable. However, columns (2) and (4) indicate that there is also a positive
partial correlation between the coverage-adjusted minimum wage level and the mean teen
or young-adult wage level. This positive correlation is even stronger if we drop the
coverage adjustment. These results indicate that minimum wage changes as captured by the
Kaitzindexdo provide a valid experiment for estimating the effects of exogenous wage
increases on employment.'7
Based on their criticism of our minimum wage variable, CKK proceed to reestimate
our employment equation using the log of the state minimum wage level in place of the
Kaiiz index, and report a positive effect of minimum wages on employment.'8 However,
there are at least three reasons to question this alternative specification. First, it seems
inappropriate to specify the employment equation as a function only of the nominal
14minimum wage. Generally, both labor supply and demand are assumed to respond to
changes in real wage rates, and the use of nominal minimum wage levels would seem to
violate the standard homogeneity assumption. In this sense, given the absence of regional
price data, dividing the minimum wage level by an average wage measure provides a way to
adjust minimum wages for nominal wage levels. Of course, the year effects included in the
equation pick up aggregate changes in wage levels over time. However, neither they nor
the state effects pick up variation within states, over time.
Second, in our original paper we discussed possible endogeneity arising from the fact
that states might increase minimum wages when employment or employment growth is high.
leading to a positive bias in the estimated minimum wage coefficient." It seems likely that
the minimum wage level, which CKK use, is more prone to this endogeneity bias than is a
relative minimum wage variable. With a relative minimum wage variable, high labor
demand might be expected to raise the average wage, offsetting in part the endogeneity bias
attributable to the tendency of governments to raise minimum wages when labor markets
are tight. This offset, however, is not present when the minimum wage level is used alone.
This is speculative, but we regard research on the endogenous determination of minimum
wages and employment as a promising area for future research.2°
Third, going back to Marshall, there are three potential employment-reducing effects
of wage increases: a scale effect, substitution away from labor and towards other inputs, and
substitution away from labor that has become relatively more expensive towards labor that
has become relatively cheaper. The relative minimum wage variable is intended to capture
explicitly the latter effect, which we view as likely to be the principal response. ln
particular, a minimum wage increase raises the relative cost of less-skilled labor roughly in
proportion to the minimum wage increase, leading to substitution away from less-skilled
15labor and towards more-skilled labor. Furthermore, a considerable portion of this more-
skilled labor may consist of relatively older workers. Thus, it seems appropriate to use a
relative wage measure, with the average wage in the state as a proxy for the price of more-
skilled labor.2'
We should note that CKK do acknowledge that, at least on theoretical grounds, it
may be more appropriate to specify employment as depending on the minimum wage
relative to the wage of other workers, and they report that when they include the log of the
minimum wage and the average wage separately, the estimated coefficient of the average
wage variable is insignificant. However, as reported in Table 5, in examining such evidence
further, we find that the restriction implied by a relative minimum wage measure--that the
coefficients of the log minimum wage and log average wage are equal (in absolute value)
and opposite-signed--generally cannot be rejected for teens or young adults in specifications
excluding or including the enrollment rate. Also, the estimated elasticities of employment
with respect to the minimum wage variable restricted in this fashion are negative for all of
these specifications (although significant or marginally so only for the specifications
including enrollment). These results, coupled with the results that CKK report, suggest that
the data are largely uninformative as to whether the minimum wage should be entered
relative to an average wage. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are
inclined towards what seems the theoretically preferable relative minimum wage measure.
Nonetheless, the estimates reported by CKK using the minimum wage level, together
with those in Table 5usingthe relative minimum wage, indicate that much of the negative
effect of the relative (not coverage-adjusted) minimum wage variable comes through the
mean wage for all workers, rather than the minimum wage level. Of course, as we argued
above, a minimum wage index should have this property; as the general level of wages rises,
16a given nominalminimum wage shouldhaveless bite.But the original criticism that
Freeman (1982) directed at cross-sectional estimates of standard minimum wage-
employment equations--that unobserved demand variation may induce a positive correlation
between employment rates and average wages, and hence a negative correlation between
employment rates and relative minimum wages--may also apply here. Fixed state effects in
our work, as well as Card's (1992a), are intended to capture persistent wiobserved demand
variation. But they will not capture year-to-year fluctuations, and hence the estimated
coefficient of the minimum wage variable may be downward biased even when fixed state
effects are included.
As a partial attempt to address the importance of this negative bias in the estimated
coefficient of the coverage-adjusted relative minimum wage variable, we compare estimated
minimum wage effects including and excluding the prime-age male unemployment rate.22
If demand variation induces a negative correlation between the employment rate and the
minimum wage variable, then the estimated minimum wage effect should be stronger
(negative) when we omit an observable measure of demand conditions. Because our
preferred specification includes the current and lagged minimum wage variable, we extend
the basic employment equation to include the current and lagged unemployment rate, in
order to fully capture any correlation between the average wage in the denominator of the
minimum wage variable(s) and the unemployment rate. In general, the employment
elasticities are only slightly larger (in absolute value) when the prime-age unemployment
rate is excluded. For teens, the estimated elasticities including the unemployment rate are
0.01 and -0.17 (first excluding. and then including the enrollment rate), while the
corresponding estimated elasticities excluding the unemployment rate are -0.01 and -0.18.
For young adults the results are identical whether or not the enrollment rate is included; the
17estimated elasticityincluding the unemployment rate is -0.15, and is -0.16whenthe
unemploymentrateis excluded. These small differences suggest that the estimated
elasticities are not biased downward because of unobserved demand variation.
Finally, CKK also claim that a variable measuring the fraction affected by the
minimum wage, defined as the proportion of workers between thenewand the old
minimum wage, is superior to the Kaitz index because "it automatically accounts for the
inter-state variation in the distribution of teenage wages." Of course, the Kaitz index also
accounts for inter-state variation in the wage distribution by dividing by the mean wage in
the state. Moreover, the fraction affected variable has two shortcomings. First, it ignores
coverage, which is an important source of variation in effective minimum wages. Second, it
does not capture the erosion of the effective minimum wage due to increases in average
wages: to see this, note that in the absence of an increase in the nominal minimum wage
level, the fraction affected variable will be equal to zero regardless of the rate of increase
in the average wage. In this sense, the fraction affected variable is subject to the same
criticism as is CKK's suggestion to use the minimum wage level instead of a relative
minimum wage.
D. LaggedMinimumWageEffects
CKK questionour analysis of the differences between the negative employment
effects of minimum wages that we find, and Card's (1992a) findings that in one-year first
differences, cross-state changes in minimum wages (using the fraction-affected variable)
induced by the 1990 increase in the federal minimum wage were positively associated with
employment changes. In our original paper, we show that in our data set as well, one-year
first-difference estimates tend to generate positive minimum wage effects on employment.
We then show that there is evidence of lagged minimum wage effects in the data, and that
18the omission of these lagged effects leads to substantial upward bias in short first-difference
estimates.23
Using Card's data, CKK attempt to reexamine the issue of lagged minimum wage
effects by using two-year changes instead of the one-year changes originally reported in
Card's paper. In particular, they report positive coefficients on Card's minimum wage
variable when the two-year change in the employment rate is used as the dependent
variable. However, using two-year changes instead of one-year changes is not the same as
incorporating lags, and in particular eliminates only part of the potential bias associated
with omitting lagged minimum wage effects. To see this, suppose, as we assume in our
paper, that the true model is
(4)E1 = BMW,, - yMW,.1 + S,á +
where E is the employment rate, MW is the minimum wage variable, S is a vector of fixed
state effects, i indexes states, t indexes years. y > (), and the other control variables have
beenomitted. if the model inlevelsomitting lags is used to obtain first differences, then
the first-difference regression
(5)ET - E.1 = B(MV-M\V.1)+( -
has an omitted variable (MW.1 - MW.2). This omitted variable is negatively correlated
with the included variable (MWd - MW.1), and because the coefficient on MW1.1 is negative
in the true model (equation (4)), the first-difference estimate of B is biased upward; in
addition, the lagged effects are missing. The evidence presented in our paper is consistent
with this set-up: when the first-difference model is estimated including the lagged variable
(MW11.1 - MW11.1), the estimates of B fall, and the estimates of y are negative.
What happens when two-year differences are used? in this case the first-difference
regression
19(6)(E1 — E,,) = B( MVI — N1V.2) + (-
has an omitted variable (MW.1 - MWI3). There is less reason (if any) to believe that this
omitted variable is negatively correlated with the included variable. However, there is still
the problem that the model does not pick up lagged minimum wage effects. Thus, while we
are less likely to get a positive estimate of B because of the omitted variable, we still do not
obtain estimates of the full disemployment effects of minimum wages from the two-year
first-difference model. The reason is that, given the true model, the change in the minimum
wage variable between periods t-3 and i-I affects the employment change between periods
t-2 and t.
With our data, we obtain results consistent with exactly this scenario. Table 6 reports
results for the two-year first-difference model, first excluding and then including (MW, -
MW3).Asexpected, in contrast to the one-year first-difference results reported in our
paper, the estimated coefficient of the contemporaneous change in the minimum wage
variable does not fall once the omitted lagged variable is added. However, estimates from
the two-year first-difference model (without lags) still understate the disemployment effects
of minimum wages, as the estimated coefficient of the lagged change is negative, and
sometimes significant. Thus, both one- and two-year differenced equations excluding the
lagged minimum wage variable appear to he biased against finding a negative employment
effect of minimum wages.
E. SLthminirnwnWage Usage
Ourmain evidence on the extent to which youth subniinimum wages moderate the
disemployment effects of minimum wages comes from our standard employment equation
augmented to include an interaction between a dummy variable indicating the existence of a
state subminimum wage, and the gap between the effective state minimum wage level and
20any state subminimum(multiplied bycoverage, and divided by the average wage). The
estimated coefficient of this interaction variable is positive, and generally significant. In
addition to the evidence based on the employment regressions, we also report information
from the outgoing rotation group files of the 1989 CPSonwage distributions for teenagers
residing in states with legislated minimum wages above the federal level. CKK contest our
conclusion, based on these wage distributions, that subminimum wage provisions induce
spikes at the subminimum. They also contest the plausibility of our regression estimates
indicating that subrninimum wages moderate disemployment effects of minimum wages,
based on their claim that subminimum wage provisions are used only infrequently by
employers.
With respect to the question of whether subminimum wage provisions generate spikes
at the subminimum, CKK note (as do we) that for eight of the 12 states we examine, there
is no spike at the state subminirnum; in contrast, there is some evidence of a spike for
Vermont, and stronger evidence for Washington, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. However,
we point out that most of those states without spikes are high-wage states (New England
states, Hawaii, Alaska, and California), with large proportions of teenagers earning above
the state minimum wage. Indeed, as shown in Table 7, four of the five states with the
lowest proportion of workers above the subminimum (they are ranked in increasing order of
this proportion) have a spike at the subminimum. For three of these (Vermont,
Pennsylvania, and Washington) the subminimum coincides with the federal minimum wage.
It is true that we note the possibility that these spikes could be due to coverage by federal
but riot state laws (because of exemptions in the state laws), but they could also be due to
state laws.
CKK suggest inferring whether these spikes at $3.35 are attributable to subminimum
21wages by askingwhetherthere are similar spikes for older workers, for whom there are also
likely to be a fairly large number of lower-wage workers. They claim to find a spike at
$3.35 in the wage distributions for senior citizens in the same states for which we find spikes
at $3.35 for teenagers. However, we could not corroborate this claim. Using the same data
file as for teenagers, the last column of Table 7 reports the proportions of workers aged 60
or over at the state subminimum (actually, in a five-cent range around the subminimum. as
discussed below). For two of the three states in question (Washington and Vermont) there
are no older workers at the subminimum, and for the third (Pennsylvania) the proportion of
older workers at the subminimum is 0.01, compared with 0.05 for teenagers!4 Thus, it
appears that the spikes in the wage distributions for teenagers at $3.35 are in fact induced
by subminimum wage laws.
Minnesota is the one relatively low-wage state among the 12 we examine that has a
state subminimum ($3.47) above the federal level. We report a spike at this subminirnum
wage level. As CKK point out, this 'spike actually covers the five-cent range ($3.47-$3.52),
because we use cells extending over five-cent ranges in tabulating our distributions.
Although we (regrettably) neglected to report these cell ranges in the paper, we do not
think that it is inappropriate to use five-cent cells, and to include $3.47 in the five-cent
range encompassing $3.50. More than 90 percent of teenagers in our 1989 sample of states
with minimum wage levels above the federal level report an hourly wage that is a multiple
of five cents, suggesting that many employers (or perhaps CPS respondents) round hourly
wage rates to the nearest nickel or dime. Indeed, Katz and Krueger (1991) examine use of
the subminimum in CPS data by reporting the proportion of workers earning within five
cents (i.e., an eleven-cent range) of the $3.35 federal subniinimum in 1990. Finally,
employers can of course exploit subminimum wage provisions without paying workers
22exactly the subminimum wage,bypayinga wage betweentheminimum and the
subminimum, andthus a spike in the wage distribution slightly above the subminimumis
consistentwith its use.
In contrast, CKK claim that many states have a spike at $3.50 (which we suppose
they would also attribute to rounding), and that our apparent spike at Minnesota's
subminimum wage is thus misleading. However, Table 7 reveals little or no evidence of a
spike at exactly S3.5t) for any states except Minnesota, and for four of them (albeit higher-
wage states), there are no observations at exactly $3.50. In addition, again using CKK's idea
of examining the wage distribution for older workers to ask whether spikes for teenagers
are attributable to subminimum wages, we note the absence of any older workers in
Minnesota (as well as most other states) in the five-cent range including $3.50. CKK also
note that the one worker in Minnesota who actually reported earning $3.47 also earned tips
that boosted hourly earnings to $6.00. However, in Minnesota tips could not be used to
satisfy state minimum wage laws in 1989:25 thus, this individual was still being paid the
subminimurn according to law. We therefore stand by our conclusion that there is evidence
of spikes in the wage distribution induced by subminimum wages, although we should point
out that we do not find evidence of spikes that are much larger than those reported in the
Iiterature.'
Finally, low rates of usage of subminimum wage provisions are not inconsistent with
moderating effects of these provisions, because the disemployment effects of minimum
wages that we and others estimate are small relative to teen employment. Suppose that a
youth sub[ninimum offsets about one-third of the disemployment effect of a minimum wage.
as our estimates suggest. Then, for an employment elasticity of -0.15 (roughly the midpoint
of our range of estimates), a 30 percent increase in the minimum wage (paralleling that
23which occurredbetween 1989 and 1991) leads to a 4.5 percent reduction in the employment
rateinastatewithouta subminimumwage,and a threepercent reductionin a comparable
state with a subminimum wage. This moderating effect ofthe subminimumin the latter
state requiresthatonly 1.5percentofteenagersbeemployed at the subminimum, even
assuming that all ofthehigher employment in the state with the subminimum wage occurs
at the subminimum; of course, someoftheadditionalemployment could beatwages above
thesubminimumbut below the minimum.In anycase, thisestimate of 1.5percent iswithin
the range ofexistingestimatesof subminimumwage usage.
Ill.Conclusion
At present, the evidence from recent studies of minimumwagesshows that there is a
broad range of estimates of the employment effects of minimum wages. The wide range of
estimates may be maddeningfromthe perspective of policy-makers. But incontrastwith
earlier research,recentstudiesof minimumwagesarecharacterized bywidely-varying types
ofdata and statistical experiments. Thus, thiswide rangeofestimates(and the perception
that it has widened) isnotentirelysurprising.Attempts such as CKK'scomment to explain
thisrange of estimates, and to narrow it, constitute a fruitful avenue of research, and are
likely todeepenour understanding of minimumwageeffects and the workingsoflabor
markets. Nonetheless,wedo notfindCKK'scriticismof our work tobecompelling, and we
do notbelieve thatthey have refuted our results.
24Endnotes
I. In contrast, Taylorand Kim(1993) report large disemployment effects in retail trade, while
Williams (1993) finds disemployment effects in some regions of the U.S.
2.Supply variables also determine employment for some observations if there is monopsonv
inlow-wage labormarkets (and some observations are in the region where employment is
determinedbythe supplycurve).
3. This argument is formalized in Brown, et al. (1982), pp. 493-4.
4. We measure enrollment from the "Employment Status Recode" on the CPS files, which
codes an individual as employed if he or she has a job in the survey week, and only otherwise
allows the possibility that the respondent is enrolled in school. As CKK point out, this
variable does not correspond exactly to the label we assign it in the tables in our original
paper, namely the "proportion of the age group in school."
5. For teenagers, across states, the mean proportion neither in school nor employed is 0.17,
and this proportion ranges from 0.03 to 0.33. For young adults, the mean proportion is 0.20,
and it ranges from 0.08 to 0.42. Other than employed and enrolled, the employment status
recode classifies individuals as unemployed and looking for work, and not in the labor force
because of home responsibilities, inability to work, retirement, and other reasons.
6. In addition, as we report in our paper (Table 2 and footnote 12), the partial correlations of
both employment rates and enrollment rates with the minimum wage variable are negative.
(Although not reported in the paper, the raw correlations are also negative.) If instead our
enrollment rate variable were one minus the employment rate plus noise, then the partial
correlation of the minimum wage variable with the employment rate would simply be the
negative of the partial correlation of the minimum wage variable with the enrollment rate.
7. It is worth noting that evidence suggesting that the minimum wage reduces the sum of the
enrollment and employment rate is not inconsistent with findings in the existing literature
(including our 1992 paper) that in teenage employment equations excluding the enrollment
rate, minimum wages do not reduce employment. This is because such employment equations
are reduced form equations. Suppose that, as in equation (3), employment is determined by
E =aMW+Xsy+E , whereXs is enrollment, a <0,y <0,and XD has been dropped. If
enrollment is determined by Xs =a'MW+e',wherea' <0,then the reduced form for
employment is E =[a+a'y]MW+E"Inthis reduced form, the expected sign of the
minimum wage coefficient is ambiguous and may be close to zero even though a and a' are
negative. In contrast, the reduced form for the sum E +Xsis E +Xs=[a+a'(l+
+ e" . Here,the expected sign of the minimum wage coefficient is negative as long as y ￿
-1,consistent with the evidence in our paper and Table I.
8. The alternative definitions did lead us to err in footnote 13 of our original paper, where we
discuss the apparent discrepancy between the estimated coefficient of our enrollment variable
and published data on the difference between the employment rates of the enrolled and non-
enrolled that are based on October CPS's.
9. However, when we correct for heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation in the
errors, the estimated elasticities are very close using the alternative enrollment measures.
Using our original measure we obtain elasticities (standard errors) of -.24 (.06) for teenagersand -.13 (.04) for young adults; the corresponding estimates using the alternative measure
are -.22 (.08) and-.14(.05). See Neumark and Wascher (1993a) for details.
10. When these estimates are also corrected for heteroskedasticity and first-order serial
correlation in the errors, using our enrollment rate the elasticities (standard errors) for
teenagers and young adults are -.39 (.08) and -.14 (.04); the corresponding estimates using the
alternative measure are -.19 (.10) and -.15 (.05).
11. Previous time-series research using the Kaitz index sometimes used youth employment
shares by industry to weight industry coverage data (Brown, et aL, 1982, P. 500). However,
we are unaware of any data on FLSA coverage by industry and state either. Of course, we
can never expect to have the "ideal' coverage data, measuring the proportion of workers
covered by minimum wage legislation ex ante (i.e., before any employment effects of
minimum wages have occurred). In addition, in Table 6 of our original paper we report
estimated minimum wage elasticities excluding the coverage measure, as well as incorporating
our best estimates of coverage by state minimum wage laws.
12. For example, in 1990 4.7 percent of employed teenagers and 6.7 percent of employed
young adults were in the state and local sector, compared with 14.1 percent of all employed
workers.
13. In the table we use logs of the relative minimum wage and coverage variables so that we
can test the equality of the coefficients of these variables implied by the coverage-adjusted
relative minimum wage variable. The results regarding the effects of coverage are
qualitatively similar using levels.
14. While there is no theoretical basis for the restriction that, say, a 10-percent increase in the
minimum wage level should have the same effect as a ten-percent increase in coverage, the
theoretical models of minimum wage effects surveyed in Brown, ci al. (1982) suggest that
there should be an interactive effect of minimum wage levels and coverage, in that an
increase in the minimum wage should have a larger effect the higher is the coverage rate. In
fact, as the last row of Table 3 shows, this restriction is not rejected at the five-percent
significance level, although there is some evidence against the restriction for young adults at
higher significance levels.
15. Technically speaking, the Kaitz index is defined as a weighted average of such a measure
defined over industries. Since our minimum wage variable is in the same spirit, we use the
label here as well.
l To reach this conclusion, CKK must be reasoning as follows: When the minimum wage
increases, the average teen wage increases. But their evidence suggests that the average teen
wage is negatively associated with our minimum wage index, which is in turn negatively
associated with employment. Therefore when the average teen wage goes up, employment
goes up. (If CKK are thinking of sources of increases in average teen wages other than those
stemming from minimum wage increases, then their conclusion does not follow, since we
could be seeing movements along the labor supply curve.)
17. Another way to assess the validity of the Kaitz index is to ask whether increases in
minimum wages are associated with increases in the Kaitz index. Regression estimates of the
Kaitz index on the controls used in Table 4, as well as a dummy variable indicating whether
the minimum wage increased from the previous year to the present year, indicate that theanswer to this questionisyes.Theestimatedcoefficienton the dummy variable for a
minimum wage increase is 0.014, with a standard error of 0.004.
18. CKK also report a set of what they label as structural estimates of the labor demand
curve, using the log of the average teen wage on the right-hand side, and instrumenting for it
with the log of the minimum wage. The resulting coefficient estimates are sometimes positive
and marginally significant. The reason to instrument is that a positive estimate of the
coefficient on the teen wage may reflect variation along the supply curve attributable to labor
demand shocks. (This same problem imparts a downward bias to estimated minimum wage
effects using a minimum wage variable with an average wage in the denominator, a problem
we address in our original paper and in this reply.) However, instrumenting with the
minimum wage as CKK do leads to identification problems. In particular, there is no reason
to expect the minimum wage to shift the labor supply curve, and hence their procedure does
not identify the teen wage coefficient in the labor demand equation. For observations for
which minimum wages are binding, minimum wages do trace out the labor demand curve,
although not by shifting the labor supply curve; for these observations, though, there is no
simultaneity problem, and thus no reason to instrument. In contrast, for observations for
which minimum wages are non-binding, minimum wages ark. 1evant. Thus, what is really
required is to separate sample observations into those for which minimum wages are and are
not binding; in Neumark and Wascher (1993b) we present one such approach.
19. in that paper, using as an instrument the average of bordering states' minimum wages
(multiplied by coverage and divided by the average wage), we find no statistical evidence of
endogeneity, although the estimated minimum wage effects are more negative than the OLS
(within-group) estimates. We have since recomputed these estimates using the average of the
higher of either federal or state minimum wages in bordering states, which is more consistent
with the rest of our original paper. These estimates also are more negative than the within-
group estimates, although the contrast is less sharp.
20. Cox and Oaxaca (1982) is the only paper of which we are aware that addresses the
determination of minimum wages, although not in the context of joint endogeneity with
employment.
21. We regard the scale effect as likely to be minor, because a minimum wage hike would
have only a small influence on overall costs, except perhaps in establishments using primarily
minimum-wage labor. There is virtually no minimum wage research that incorporates the
relative prices of other inputs in the employment equation; one exception is Hamermesh's
(1982) time-series study, which introduces a capital price measure.
22. We also addressed this question in our original paper, where we separated the coverage-
adjusted minimum wage from the mean wage for all workers, and found a negative effect for
the former. Here we take a different approach to the same question.
23. This is supported by the fact that the inclusion of a lagged minimum wage variable
eliminates the differences between the short first-difference and within-group estimates, the
latter of which are less upward biased by the omission of lagged effects.
24. These differences in the sizes of the spikes are not attributable to a larger proportion of
teenagers earning wages near the minimum. For Washington and Vermont, of course, the
proportion of older workers at the subrninimum remains at zero even if we look only at
lower-wage workers. For Pennsylvania, when we restricted attention to workers earning lessthan S5.U)perhour,the proportion of older workers at the subminimum was 0.03. compared
with0.07 for teenagers.
25. Memorandum from Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry.
26. CKJ. also dispute our statement that 'research on subminimum wages is in its infancy, and
a more definitive answer awaits further research." In their comment, CKK add a bracketed
insert indicating that this statement applies to usage rates of subminimum wages. The
statement actually applies to evidence on the effects of subminimum wage laws on
employment. According to CKK, our statement "denies a substantial body of evidence that
consistently finds extremely low usage of the subminimum wage." In fact, in our paper we
cite two of the three studies that were written prior to our 1992 paper, although we neglected
to cite Katz and Krueger (1991).
Of the five studies that CKK cite, four are based only on the experience with the
federal subminimum implemented in 1990 (in contrast to the state subminimums that we study
for the 1973-1989 period), and three of these four focus on the restaurant industry. The fifth
study (Freeman, et al., 1981) looks at the federal student subminimum. it is not clear,
however, that conclusions from these studies should be generalized to other forms of
subminimum wages, in part because both of the federal submininium wage programs have
quite restrictive provisions. In the case of the federal student subminimum, the evidence
suggests that these restrictions were constraining Freeman, et al. report that in a survey of
managers of establishments using the student subrninimum, over 70% said that they would use
the subminimum more frequently if these restrictions were relaxed. Finally, there are no
studies of which we are aware that attempt to estimate whether subminimum wages moderate
the clisemployment effects of minimum wages. Thus, we contend that there is still room for
additional evidence on subminimum wages.re nce
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Mimeograph,University ofCincinatti.</ref_section>Table I: Estimates of Regressions for Sum of Employment and Enrollment Rates'
Teenagers (16-19) Young Adults (16-24)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coverage-adjusted r&ative -.02 -.20 -.19 -.02 -.13 -.12
minimumwage (.07) (.08) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.06)
Coverage-adjusted relative -.20 -.10 -.11 -.18 -.12 -.16
minimum wage, lagged one year (1)7) (.08) (1)8) (.08) (.07) (.07)
Proportionof ... ... -.13 -.01
population in age group (.17) (.08)
Prime-age male ... -22 ... -.46
unemp4oyment rate (.08) (.06)
State and year effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
.03 .45 .45 .03 .66 .68
a. Dependent variable is the sum of employment and enrollment rates. The sample consists of 700 observations
covering the 50 states and Washington. D.C. For the twenty-two states identified us the CPS as early as 1973, the
sample covers the years 1974-1989; for the remaining states it covers the period 1978-1989. Standard errors of
estimates are reported in parentheses.
Table 2: Estimates of Minimun, Wage Effects Using Alternative Definitions of the Enrollment Rates
Teenagers (16-191 Young Adults (16-24)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coverage-adjusted relative .10 -.12 .03 -.03 -.10 -.05
:rimurn wage (.11) (.08) (.11) (.08) (.06) (.07)
Coveragc-adjusted rClativc -.14 -.12 -.16 -.2.6 -.18 -.22
minimum wage, lagged one year (.12) (.07) (.11) (.08) (.0(s) (1)8)
Proportion of age group in. -77 .. -.81
school and not employed (.03) (.04)
Proportion of age group reporting... . .37 -.46
major activity as school (.04) (.03)
.70 .74 .71 .83 .77
Elasticity -.03 -.19 -.11 -.18 -.17 -.16
(.10) (.07) (.09) (.06) (.04) (.05)
Estimates usinQ oniv tanned
minimum wage variable:
Elasticity -.08 -.14 -.12 -.17 -.14 -.15
(.09) (.06) (.08) (.05) (.04) (.04)
Estimates instrumenting
for enrollment ratc:b
Elasticity .. -.25 -.17 -.16 -.12
(.10) (.13) (.05) (.06)
a. Dependent variable is the employment rate. All specifications include fixed state and year effects, the proportion
of populatioo in the age group, and the prime-age male unemployment rate. Sec notes to Table 1 for more details.
b. Due to unavailability of instruments, sample period excludes 1974. Instruments are school expenditures per pupil,
pupil-teacher ratios, and dummy variables for compulsory schooling ages. See Neumark and Wascher (1993a) for




























coeflicient of log(coveragc rate) =
coefficient of log(minimum wage/
mean wage) 1.0(1 3$ .08 IS
a. Dependent variable is the employment rate. In allcases,elasticities are based on specifications including
contemporaneous and one-year Lags of relative minimum wage and coverage variables, and are evaluated at samptc
means. Standard errors of elasticities reported in parentheses treat coeFficient estimates, but not means, as random.
AU specifications include fixed state and year effects, the proportion of population in the age group, and the prime-
age male unemployment rate as controls. The proportion of age group in school and not employed is included as a
control variable in columns (2) and (4). Sec notes to Table I for more details. P-values arc based on likelihood-
ratio tests.
Tahle 4: Estimates of Minimum Wage Effects on Mean and Relative Wages'
Teenagers(16-19) Young adults(16-24)
Mean teen wage! Mean young adult Mean young
mean wage Mean teen wage wage/mean wage adult wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coverage-adjustedrelative .48 ... ...
minimum wage (.12) (.10)




a. Dependent variables are Listed in column headings. The sample consists of 751 observations covering the 50 sLates
and Washington, D.C., from 1973-1989 for the twenty-two states identified in the CP as early as 1973, and from
1977-1989 for the remaining states. All specifications include fixed stateand yeareffects, the proportion of
population in the age group, andtheprime-agemale unemployment rateas controls. Results are virtually identical
whentheproportion oF agegroupin school andnotemployed is included asa controlvariable. Minimum wage
refers to the higher of the federalorstate minimum wage.Meanwage refers to the mean wage for all workers,Table 5 Tests of Relattve Minimum Wage Constraint
Teenagers (16-191 Young Adults (10-24)
Specifications including (I) (2) (3) (4)
contemooraneous and laued
lo relative minimumwaC
Elasticity -.112 -.11 -.08 -. I I
(.12) (.118) (.07) (.05)
P-value for restrictions that .57 .29 .09 .65




lo relative minimum wage
P-value For restriction that .42 .o'. .02 .34,
nunilnum wage enters relative
to mean wage
a. Dependent variable is the employment rate. Elasticities are based on estimated coefficients of current (and
lagged) values of log(minimum wage/mean wage). The long-run elasticity evaluated at the sample means is
reported. Standard errors of elasticities reported in parentheses treat coefficient estimates, but not means, as
random. All specifications include fixed state and year eitects, rise proportion of population in the age group, and
the prime-age male unemployment rate as controls. The proportion of age group in school and not employed is
included as a control variable in columns (2) and (4). Sec notes to Tables 1 and 3 for more details. P-values arc
based on likelihood-ratio tests.
Table 1,: Two-Year First-Difference Estimates of Minimum Wage Effects'
Teenagers (10-19) Young Adults (10-241
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Coverage-ad jusied relative .211 -.04 2t -.02 .08 -.07 .12 -.05
minimum wage. I - (t-2) (.17) (.12) (.17) (.12) (.12) (.10) (.12)(It))
coverage-adjusted relative .. ... -.35 -.13 .. ... -26 -.15
minimum wage, (I-I) - (t-3) (.16) (.11) (.12) (.09)
Proportion of age group in ... -.75 ... - .75 .. -.74 ... - .74
school and not employed, (.04) (.04) (.05) (.05)
I - (1-2)
R1 .13 .57 .14 .57 .17 .47 .18 .4.8
a. Dependent variable is the two-year change in the employment rate. All specifications include Fixed year effects,
and the two-year change (from 1-2 to I) in the proportion oF population in the age group and the prime-age male
unemployment rate as controls. The years 1976, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1984, 1985, 1988, and 1989 are used to avoid
scriai correlation introduced by the differencing operation. Thus, The sample consists of 350 observations. Standard
errors of estimates are reported in parentheses.Table 7: age Distributions in High Minimum Wage States. t'89
Teenagers I 16-19) OlderWorkers (0
ProportionProportion Proportion
State State AboveState at Proportion at
MinimumSubminimum Minimum5 Suhminimumbat $3.50 Subminimurn
(I> (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
California 4J5 3,61 .69 .00 .01 .1)1)
Washington 3.?)5 3.35 .69 .06 .02 .00
Minnesota 3.5 3.47 .73 .08 .06 .00
Pennsylvania 370 3.35 .75 .05 .02 .1)1
crmont 3.1,5 3.35 .77 .05 .00 .1)0
Maine 3.75 3.35 .82 .03 .01 .1k)
Connecticut 4.25 3.61 .83 .00 .1)2 .00
Hawaii 3.85 3.35 .85 .00 .00 .0)
Rhode Island 4.00 3.ôij .91.) .00 .02 lii
Massachusetts 3.75 3.35 .91J .01 .01 .002
A1aka 3.?.5 3.35 .93 IX) .00 .110
New Hampshire 3.t5 335 .94 .01) .00 .00
a. Based on outgoing rotation group files. In Slates for which thc slate subminimum is less than or equal to $3.35.
we treat the actual subminimum wage level as superseded by the federal minimum wage. An entry of .01) ind,caie
no observations.
h. These columns refer to live-cent ranges defined as $3.33-53.37. S3.37-3.42, etc.